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Building a deep-water drilling rig that incorporates the latest technology while meeting internal 
requirements, client specifications, and budget constraints, can be a daunting challenge. Doing so 
in a post-Macondo environment with a shortage of qualified personnel to man the rig adds even 
more obstacles to overcome. Ensuring that a variety of rig systems supplied by different vendors 
will be integrated into a workable rig that is properly maintained is another task for the drilling 
contractor. 
The risk management plan was implemented in the form of individual risk assessments focused on 
each of various systems utilizing primarily the failure modes effects and criticality (FMECA) 
methodology. It can be quite surprising to evaluate the results of these sessions and realize how 
powerful these tools can be and how effective they can be in identifying potential faults and 
weaknesses in the systems. Maintaining a global view of the rig while carrying out the individual 
risk assessments was critical to ensure overall integration of the systems. 
The paper results will highlight examples of findings across a wide spectrum of rig systems, from 
the cooling water system of active heave drawworks braking resistors to NOVEC release on an 
F&G detection system to challenges on a pipe handling system. Each example will have its own 
unique circumstances, but they all highlight the importance and value of implementing an effective 
risk management strategy.  
This paper also demonstrates that implementing a risk management plan during the design and 
construction of the rigs can help reduce risks associated with major accidents and downtime. This 
can be accomplished by applying the results of the risk assessments into training of personnel, 
updating of operational procedures, updating of maintenance procedures, modifying designs, 
changing control systems and re-programming software. This paper presents the results of risk 
assessments applied to semi-submersibles and drill-ships, all 6th generation deep-water drilling 
rigs. 
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Building a deep-water rig that incorporates the latest innovations of technology and automation 
is a challenge that requires planning, coordination, and a thorough understanding of the 
limitations of people and machines. Implementing a risk assessment and management program is 
an essential part of the rig building process. 
 
Figure 1 - 6th Generation Drill ships 
Consider some of the challenges facing a drilling contractor in building a modern 6th generation 
ultra-deep-water rig:  
 Highly complex systems designed and manufactured by multiple vendors 
 Integrating complex systems with the shipyard-built systems 
 Highly automated systems that require coordination and integration 
 Highly automated systems that need to be operated by rig personnel 
 Highly automated systems that need to be maintained (and, if required, repaired) by rig 
personnel 




2.1 Risk Assessment Objective 
The primary objective of a risk assessment is to identify, understand, and implement measures to 
mitigate the risks associated with the design and operation of the rig, systems, and equipment. 
Risk assessment is a very broad term that is used in many different contexts: financial, technical, 
project management, design, manufacturing, etc. It is important to define what we mean when 
use the term risk assessment. In our context, the following broad steps comprise the risk 
assessment process: 
1. Hazard Assessment 
2. Risk Evaluation 
3. Risk Mitigation 
It is not our objective to explain in detail the risk management strategy that can be implemented; 
a risk assessment is one of the steps in the process. In general, this paper presents the risk 
assessment process based on numerous past projects and experiences. The primary tool utilized 
was the failure modes, effects and criticality assessment (FMECA). This is a well-established 
methodology in the oil and gas industry that was originally developed for use in the aerospace 
(and military) industry to analyse complex systems. The methodology was modified to suit the 
particular needs of the systems and situations to be reviewed for the project. This modification to 
the methodology included heavy emphasis on preparation, participation, and technical content, 
particularly in the function description of components. The following figure portrays the 
FMECA process:   
 
The following typical questions were asked during the risk assessment: 
• What are the major components in the system? 
• How can those components fail? 
• What root causes create those failures? 
• How can those failures affect the performance of the component? 
• How can those failures affect the performance of the system? 
• How can those failures affect the performance of the rig? 
• What can be done to eliminate the failure? 
• What can be done to minimize the likelihood of the failure occurring? 
• What can be done to reduce the consequences if the failure occurs? 
• Can you detect the failure? (Is it a hidden failure?) 
• What is the required maintenance and inspection on the system components? 
• How can you improve the system performance? 
 
2.2 Level of Detail 
The process emphasizes preparation, participation, and technical content. This approach 
maximizes the value of the participants’ time in the session and extracted the most relevant 
Figure 2 Typical FMECA Methodology 
information via productive discussions throughout the assessment. In an attempt to demonstrate 
the level of detail that is involved, the following figure shows a sample truncated line item in the 
FMECA spreadsheet describing a temperature transmitter on an electric motor. This is presented 
to indicate the detailed description and emphasis on technical content in the sessions. It also 









- MOTOR #1  
There are two RTD's (Resistance 
Temperature Detector), one of which is a 
spare, for each motor winding. There are 3 
temperature sensors used per motor. Any one 
sensor with a temperature above 160C 
generates an alarm. Two sensors above 180C 
generates a trip of the affected motor.  
 
With hi-hi of two sensors: 
 
1. AHC: heave compensation continues, 
affected motor will trip 
2. non AHC: ALL motors (including affected 
motor) are used to slow down the drawworks, 
and zero speed is set. Mechanical brakes are 
set. 
 
The range of the temperature sensor is 0C to 
200C. It generates a 4-20mA signal. This 
signal is sent to DW Control System PLC. 
The PLC performs all processing on the 
signals other than validation of signal 
integrity. The temperature transmitter has a 
loop monitoring function that monitors the 
element (RTD) status. If the transmitter 
detects a failure of the RTD then a high amp 
signal (greater than 20mA) is sent to the DW 


















2.3 Bottom Up Approach 
It is worth noting that the FMECA approach used is a bottom up approach. To ensure that 
systems are integrated correctly, we emphasized that failure escalation from component to sub-
system to system to the entire rig. 
 
Figure 4 Bottom Up Approach 
Participation was also a very important factor in ensuring the success of the risk assessment. We 
are referring to participation from the equipment manufacturer and the rig crews (driller, assistant 
driller, mechanic, electrician, chief engineer, tool pusher, etc.). Determining the level of 
participation and the personnel to participate is based on the system or systems being analysed. 
Obviously, systems that are heavy on electrical and electronic components, such as the drilling 
control network or anti-collision system, will involve the electrical disciplines on the rig. 
Participation of the rig crew also serves as an excellent training and educational opportunity. As 
the components, systems, and the rig is being analysed, detailed discussions inevitably arise 
leading to improved understanding of the design, operation, and maintenance of the systems. It 
also potentially leads to improvements in the design based on the feedback from the equipment 
users to the manufacturer. 
Timing of the risk assessment is a critical factor in ensuring success and maximum benefit. We 
are referring to the timeframe between detailed design and manufacturing. During this time, there 
is enough detail in the design to have a thorough and proper analysis, yet it is not too late (or too 
expensive) to modify the design should any flaws be discovered, improvements suggested, or 
recommendations proposed. 
2.4 Hierarchy of Approach  
Once the hazard identification and risk evaluation have been carried out, the final step in the 
process is to implement mitigations to address the identified risks. Generally, the hierarchy of 
approach is: 
A. Implement measures to eliminate the risks 
B. Implement measures to reduce the likelihood of the risks 
C. Implement measures to reduce the consequence 
Risk Elimination - eliminating the identified risk can occur in many forms, and via many 
techniques and processes. This can be accomplished through physical changes such as structural 
design modifications or adding or removing components (such as valves, sensors, pumps, etc.). 
There are numerous possibilities and options. It is important to note here, however, that 
implemented changes need to be incorporated in the risk assessment, otherwise there is a danger 
in introducing new hazards that have not been evaluated.  
Risk Likelihood Reduction - implementing measures to reduce the likelihood of events occurring 
can also be carried out in different ways. Examples include increased maintenance and inspection 
frequency. Another technique could be to increase capacity to a particular system (such as 
additional pump to a hydraulic system). Operational procedures can be updated or modified to 
reduce the load on a system, such the electrical generation on the rig. 
Risk Consequence Reduction - reducing the consequence can be accomplished by providing 
additional components (reduction in downtime due to inadequate spares), increased training 
(leading to faster troubleshooting and fixing of failures), increased in maintenance and inspection, 
testing frequency, etc. 
The implementation of recommendations can take the form of: 
 System design changes 
 Software changes 
 Changes to FAT (factory acceptance testing) 
 Changes to commissioning testing 
 Changes to SIT (system integration testing) 
 Updates of the critical spare parts list 
 Update of maintenance procedures 
 Update of operational procedures 
 
3 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLES: 
 
The following three (3) example findings were chosen in an attempt to demonstrate the benefit of 
carrying out an FMECA-based risk assessment: 
A. Water Mist System Redundancy 
B. Pipe Handling System Failure Escalation 
C. Anti-Collision System Fault Leading to Drawworks Stoppage 
3.1 Water Mist System Redundancy 
In this example based on a new-build rig, a risk assessment was carried out on the fire-fighting 
system. Included in the assessment was the water mist system covering several critical spaces (in 
this case the engine room). During the FMECA, it was identified that two pumps were installed in 
the system, one as primary and one as a backup. After further scrutiny, however, the FMECA team 
discovered that there was no automatic switch-over to the backup pump. So, in a fire scenario, a 
failure of the primary pump would have required that rig personnel manually switch over to the 
backup pump. This design was, of course, found to be less than ideal considering the potential for 
fire and the criticality of the system. The result was a relatively minor modification to have an 
automatic switch-over system installed. This minor modification, however, resulted in a significant 
reduction in risk by substantially increasing the expected availability of a critical fire-fighting 
system. 
3.2 Pipe Handling System Failure Escalation 
This example highlights the importance of rig personnel understanding the systems that they are 
using. This was based on a real situation where a hydraulically operated pipe handling system had 
some contamination in the hydraulic oil. This led to frequent stoppages (due to inconsistent 
movement). The rig crew did not understand the problem and their attempt to troubleshoot the root 
cause of the failure was incorrect. They opened the machine’s electrical panel and pushed the 
“reset” button in the hopes that would restart the system and potential solve the issue. The “reset” 
button, however, also served as the calibration reset. Repeat, incorrect use of the “reset” button 
resulted in a total failure of the pipe handling system. The end result was a need for support from 
an OEM technician to resolve the issue. Due to the time involved with securing the OEM 
technician, the consequence of the failure was escalated from a few hours of downtime (to flush 
out the hydraulic system and clean it) to four or five days of downtime (to send the appropriate 
OEM technician and troubleshoot the system). The serves as an example of reducing the 
consequence of failure with the correct training and system knowledge. 
3.3 Anti-Collision System Fault Leading to Drawworks Stoppage 
This final example demonstrates the importance of thorough system integration assessments and 
the complexity of inter-relationships between systems on automated rigs. In this example, while a 
rig was tripping out of the hole (the drawworks hoisting drill-pipe at high speed and low load), a 
faulty sensor in a different system (in-line compensator, which was not being used) triggered an 
anti-collision system shutdown. The led to the emergency brakes on the drawworks engaging very 
quickly, which led to a very fast stoppage of the drawworks drum at high speed, leading to the 
continued upward movement of the travelling block. The led the wire rope (fast-line) to move from 
its grooves on the crown-block (also referred to as “bird’s nest”). This was a very critical failure 
because it had the potential to part the wire rope which could have resulted in injuries or fatalities, 
and/or significant equipment damage. A detailed risk assessment would have identified the critical 
shutdown signals from other systems and would have identified that the commands from these 
signals should be ignored while these systems are not in use. 
4 Conclusion 
We have attempted to demonstrate the importance and need for a well-planned risk assessment 
process during the design and construction of deep-water rigs. This is especially true for rigs that 
are highly automated with complex systems. The benefits include significant risk reduction, better 
system integration, and detailed training and understanding of these systems by the rig crews. 
 
